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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant seeks a hearing pursuant to a denial of his 
petition for habeas corpus in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After examining the transcript, the District Court, 
upon its own motion, ordered that the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus be dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent prays that the decision of the trial 
court be affirmed. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 13th day of February, 1968, John Jaramillo 
pled guilty to a felony offense of robbery. He was rep-
resented by A1r. Jay Barney of the Salt Lake Legal De-
fenders Association. The court thereafter sentenced Mr. 
Jaramillo to confinement in the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate term (R.4). 
The respondent points out that no appeal was taken 
from this conviction. The appellant did, however, peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus on or about April 2, 
1969. In that petition, the appellant stated that his only 
ground was that he had not been warned of the con-
sequences of a plea of guilty to this particular crime and 
punishment (R.2). 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, dismissed the petiion wihout a hearing. After an 
examination of the transcript, the court stated: 
" ... ~I]t clearly appears therefrom 
that the petitioner was properly sentenced, 
that he had very competent counsel, and 
it is the Court's opinion that the Writ 
should be denied." (R.6). 
It is from this Order of Dismissal that the appellant 
has prosecuted this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT THE 
PROPER REMEDY UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
The appellant alleges two grounds in his brief for 
which he seeks review. Briefly stated, the alleged grounds 
of reversal J-re: ( 1) because the trial judge failed to advise 
Mr. Jaramillo of the maximum penalty for robbery, and 
( 2) that Jay B;lrney inadequately defended him. Both 
of these alleged grounds were known to Juan Jaramillo 
at the time of his commitment to the Utah State Prison. 
No appeal from this commitment was made. According 
to Utah law) the proper procedure would have been to 
appeal his sentence. 
Juan Jaramillo is trying to use the writ of habeas 
corpus as a means of appellate review. This is not the 
purpose for which the writ was established. A good dis-
cussion of the purpose is found in Bryant v. Turner, 19 
Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967), wherein the follow-
ing is found: 
" .. The writ is, as our rules describe 
it, an extraordinary writ, to be used to pro-
tect one who is restrained of his liberty 
where there exists no jurisdiction or author-
ity, or where the requirements of the law 
have been so ignored or distorted that the 
party is substantially and effectively denied 
what is included in the term due process of 
law, or where some other such circumstance 
exists that it would be wholly unconscion-
able not to re-examine the conviction." Id. 
19 Utah 2d at 286-287, 431 P.2d at 122-
123. 
\Vhen the same facts alleged in a pet1t10n for writ 
of habeas corpus were known to the petitioner at the time 
of his judgment, his proper remedy is not a writ. In the 
recent case of Brown v. Tumrr, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 
958 (1968), the petitioner contended that he was denied 
a right to counsel and that he did not understand the 
conseuences of his guilty plea. The Supreme Court of 
Utah held that the petitioner was not entitled to habeas 
cor;:ms remedies. The court correctly pointed out the fol-
lowing: 
" ... If the contention of error is some-
thing which is known or should be known 
to the party at the time the judgment was 
entered, it must be reviewed in the manner 
and within the time permitted by regular 
prescribed procedure, or the judgment be-
comes final and is not subject to futher at-
tack, except in some such unusual circum-
stance as we have mentioned above. Were 
it otherwise, the regular rules of procedure 
governing appeals and limitations of time 
specified therein would be rendered im-
potent." Id. 21 Utah 2d at 98-99, 440 P.2d 
at 969. 
The fact5 and circumstances surrounding Mr. Jara-
millo's commitment to the Utah State Prison are close 
to the fact situation in Brown v. Turner, supra. In that 
case the Utah Supreme Court noted: 
" ... [T]he questions as to whether he 
was accorded the right of counsel and was 
properly advised as to the consequences of 
his plea of guilty are primarily questions 
of fact. The trial court having heard the 
evidence relating thereto and having found 
the issues against the plaintiff, it is our 
further duty to indulge the usual credit due 
his findings and judgment." Id. 21 Utah at 
99, 440 P.2d at 970. 
That case should be binding authority here, and 
the ruling of the lower court should be sustained. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE OF COMPETENCY CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT BE-
CAUSE IT \VAS NOT PRESENTED BELOW. 
In his complaint and petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, Mr. Jaramillo lists only one ground-that he was 
not warned or informed of the consequences to a plea of 
guilty in a robbery charge (R.2). Nowhere in the com-
plaint is there a challenge made to Jay Barney's compe-
tency. The only place this issue is mentioned in the 
Record on Appeal is in the Order of Dismissal by Judge 
Stewart Hanson, who stated that he had read the transcript 
and had found therefrom that " ... the petitioner was 
properly sentenced, that he h:-td very competent coun-
sel. ... " (R. 6). 
Utah has passed on this issue before. In the case of 
Burleigh v. Turnr:r, 15 Utah 2d 118, 3 8 8 P.2d 412 ( 1964), 
the petitioner made the same legal move as Mr. Jara-
millo. The court expressed the law in this manner: 
"Appellant contends in his brief that the 
failure to appeal the Third District Court's 
judgment was due to the failure of coun-
sel, appointed by this court, to prosecute the 
appeal. This matter was not presented in 
the pleadings or the hearing before the 
Fourth District Court. It is raised for the 
first time upon this appeal. Habeas corpus 
being a civil remedy it is not necessary for 
this court to consider this point." Id. 15 
Utah 2 d at 12 0, 3 8 8 P. 2 d :it 414. 
It would therefore follow that the court need not 
consider the issue of Mr. Barney's competency as counsel 
since it was not challenged in Juan Jaramillo's complaint 
and was not an issue before Judge Hanson. 
There have been no findings of fact on this issue. 
No testimony has been received by any prior proceeding. 
The only information the court has on this subject is the 
appellant's statement of facts. The court is not com-
pelled to believe self-interested witnesses. State v. Knep-
per, 18 UtJh 2d 21 ), 418 P.2d 780 (1966); Aagard v. 
Da)'foll c5 Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Co., 12 Utah 2d 
34, 361 P.2d 522 ( 1961). The competency of Mr. Barney 
is therefore not ripe for review. 
Even if the court were to review the issue of Jay 
Barney's competency as counsel, the court would still have 
to find for the respondent. 
In order to justify habeas corpus relief on the 
ground that the appointed counsel was inadequate, Cali-
fornia requires the petitioner to show that the trial 
was reduced to a farce or sham. In Re Beat)', 54 Cal. 2d 
760, 414 P.2d 817, 51 Cal.Rptr. 521 (1966). 
In Arizona, the court allows a contention of de-
privation of right to counsel to be asserted in habeas 
corpus proceedings only in extreme cases. If the appel-
lant sets forth no facts which indicate the appointed at-
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torney's performance was so substandard as to render the 
trial a farce or sham, the petition is properly denied. Bar-
rn11 z·. State, 7 Ariz.App. 223. 437 P.2d 975 (Ariz.Ct.App. 
1968). 
The Utah standard is a little different. In Utah a 
habeas corpus remedy is allo"'ed only if the circumstances 
indicate th;it it would be wholly unconscionable to re-
examine the petitioner's conviction. Bryant v. Turner, 
supra. The method the Utah court uses in deciding this 
issue is to look at the record. 
In the case of Syddall i·. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 263, 
437 P.2d 194 (1968). the court looked to the record to 
see if anything suggested that the prisoner had been im-
properly induced to enter his plea of guilty. Since nothing 
was shown, the court held that he had been adequately 
represented bv counsel. 
The record in the present case clearly shows that Mr. 
Jaramillo pleaded guilty voluntarily. The transcript 
quoted on page 9 of this brief shows that Mr. Barney 
and the court were very careful about this matter. 
In the case of \VashiJ1gfo11 v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 361, 
412 P.2d 449 (1966), the court seems to look at the rec-
ord for suggestions of bad faith conduct on the part of 
the attorney. There is nothing in the record of the present 
appeal which suggests there was any bad faith on the part 
of Jay Barney. 
Since the record is devoid of any suggestion of bad 
faith, absent a showing that the trial was reduced to a 
farce or sham. and without any indication that it would 
be unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction, the 
court must affirm Judge Hanson's decision to dismiss. 
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POINT III 
JUAN JARAMILLO WAS PROPERLY SEN-
TENCED BY JUDGE SNOW. 
Even if the court were to find that the writ of 
habeas corpus is the proper remedy for Mr. Jaramillo, it 
still must find for the respondent. The complaint chal-
lenges Mr. Jaramillo's custody on the ground that the 
trial court inadequately explained the consequences of a 
guilty plea to him. To support this ground, appellant re-
lies on Utah Code Ann. § 77 -24-6 (19 5 3 ) . That section 
is set out below: 
"\Vhere the defendant is not represent-
ed by counsel, the court shall not accept a 
plea of guilty until it shall have explained 
to the defendant the consequences of such 
a plea." Id. 
It is clear that this statute does not apply in the 
present fact situation where Mr. Jaramillo was given the 
privilege of court-appointed counsel. When the de-
fendant in a criminal action has counsel, the Judge need 
not perform the defense counsel's function of explaining 
the consequences of a guilty plea. 
Even if the court were to find inadequate repre-
sentation by Mr. Barney, the explanation given to the 
defendant by the Judge was sufficient. 
In Brown v. Turner, supra, the court advised the 
defendant: 
" ... that he was charged with a felony, 
that it was punishable by a prison sentence, 
and he had a right to a trial by jury. . . . " 
Id. 21 Utah at 99-100, 440 P.2d at 970. 
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The rev1ewmg court looked at the defendants' past 
criminal activity and held the explanation adequate. 
Under the facts of the instant case. the trial court 
questioned Mr. Jaramillo as to his guilty plea in the fol-
lowing manner: 
"MR. BARNEY: Mr. Jaramillo, is it your desire 
at this tim~ to change your plea from not guilty? 
"MR. JARAMILLO: Plead guilty and get sentence 
right away. \X' aiw anything. 
"MR. BARNEY: Has anyone made any threats or 
promi~es to you to coerce you at any time into making 
such a plea:> 
"MR. JARAMILLO: No. 
"MR. BARNEY: And you enter this plea at this 
time on your own free will? 
"MR. JARAMILLO: Yes. 
"MR. BARNEY: And without any reservation or 
coercion? 
"MR. TARAMILLO: Yes. 
"MR. BARNEY: Your Honor, at this time we 
would request the right to withdraw the plea of not 
guilty previously entered and to enter a new plea. 
"THE COURT: You understand by so doing, Mr. 
JaramiHo, it means the Court will sentence you to an 
indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison? 
"MR. JARAMILLO: Yes." (T.8-9). 
From the transcript, as cited above, the following 
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three things are noticed: ( 1) the plea was voluntarily 
made; (2) the defendant was informed that he would 
be serving sentence at the Utah State Prison (felony 
charge) ; and, ( 3) the term would be indeterminate. 
Since Judge Snow not only appointed counsel for 
Juan Jaramillo, but also explained the consequences of a 
guilty plea to him, the following language from Brown v. 
Turner, supra, would again be applicable: 
"It appears to us that Judge Snow 
actually exercised commendable care in 
making sure that plaintiff understood the 
consequences of waiving a trial by jury and 
the entering of a plea of guilty." Id. 21 
Utah 2<l at 100, 440 P.2d at 970-971. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein set out, respondent submits 
that the decisions reached in the lower court must be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully sub11iitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney 
General' 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respo11den! 
